one-year real home price increases appearing in Denver and then Boston in 1999. These cities kept on appreciating at a high rate.
As years went by yet new cities started seeing substantial real home price increases. Even though it was a recession year, Miami, Minneapolis, New York, and going up at substantial rates. The result of this succession of booms, in so many places has been a massive increase in national home prices over a period of nearly a decade. The boom was tempered somewhat by the fact that some cities never experienced booms. In Atlanta, Charlotte, Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas and Detroit there was no year since 1998 in which real home prices increased by 10% in a year, though even these cities showed some increases. This dramatic price increase is hard to explain, since economic fundamentals do not match up with the price increases. Also shown on the figure is an index of real owner occupied rent (thin line). Real rent has been extremely stable when compared with price.
Real rent increased only 4% from the 1996-IV to 2006-I. The rent figures indicate that there has been virtually no change in the market for housing services, only in the capitalization of the value of these services into price.
The boom in real home prices since 1996-IV cannot be explained by rising real construction costs either, even though there appears to be a common idea, among the general public, that it might. Using data from Engineering News Record (2007) , and correcting it for inflation with the CPI-U, one finds that while the real price of ½-inch gypsum wallboard rose 41% from the trough in real home prices in 1996-IV to the peak in real home prices in 2006-I, the real price of 5/8-inch plywood rose only 9%, and the real price of 2x4 common lumber actually fell 32%. Labor costs are the single most important component of building costs, and these showed little change as common-labor earnings have stagnated. The Engineering News Record Building Cost Index corrected for inflation showed relatively little change over this interval. In fact the index corrected for CPI inflation showed a slight decline from 1996-IV to 2006-I, as can be seen in Figure 1 , dotted line.
Note that real owners' equivalent rent and real building costs track each other fairly well, as one might expect. But neither of them tracks real home prices at all, suggesting that some other factor-I will argue market psychology-plays an important role in determining home prices.
The boom may be coming to an end in the United States where a sharp turnaround in home prices can be seen in the bold line in Figure 1 , with real home prices falling 3.4% since the peak in the first quarter of 2006. Anecdotal reports are also appearing within the last year of a softening of the boom or even outright falls in home prices in other countries as well, but the data already in do not yet show this, and, on the contrary, some countries still seem to be appreciating fast. The latest S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices (for May 2007) even show a slight strengthening of the housing market in a number of cities.
When there are declines, they may be muted at first, and disguised by noise.
Home sellers tend to hold out for high prices when prices are falling. 3 The 17% decline in the volume of US existing home sales since the peak in volume of sales in 2005 is evidence that this is happening now.
The market for homes is clearly not efficient, and shows enormous momentum from year to year, as Karl Case and I first demonstrated in 1988. We attributed this inefficiency to the high transactions costs associated with this market, which make exploitation of the inefficiency prohibitively expensive. In May 2006 the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, in collaboration with the firm I co-founded, MacroMarkets LLC, created futures and options markets for US single family homes that are cash-settled using the S&P/Case-Shiller home price indices. Some day these markets may have the effect of making home prices more efficient, but these markets still are not big enough to affect the cash market very much. Given the tendency for long trends in home prices, and
given the downward momentum in price and high valuation relative to rent, the possibility of a substantial downtrend in home prices over many years into the future must be considered.
The implications of this boom and its possible reversal in coming years stand as a serious issue for economic policy makers. It may be hard to understand from past experience what to expect next, since the magnitude of the boom is unprecedented. The implications of the boom have produced difficult problems for rating agencies who must evaluate the impact of the boom on securities such as the collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) that have burgeoned in the U.S. from virtually nothing at the beginning of the housing boom to approximately $375 billion issued in 2006. The trickiest problem these agencies face in assessing these securities, many of which are backed by subprime mortgages, is correlation risk (the risk that many of the real-estate-backed assets will default at the same time) a risk that is directly connected to the risk of a macro real estate bust that may or may not follow the unprecedented boom.
In this paper, I will consider, from a broad perspective, the possible causes of this boom, with particular attention to speculative thinking among investors. I will argue that a significant factor in this boom was a widespread perception that houses are a great investment, and the boom psychology that helped spread such thinking. In arguing this, I
will make some reliance on the emerging field of behavioral economics. This field has appeared in the last two decades as a reaction against the strong prejudice in the academic profession against those who interpret price behavior as having a psychological component. The profession had come to regard all markets as efficient, and to reject those who say otherwise. Now, however, behavioral economics is increasingly recognized, and has developed a substantial accumulation of literature that we can use to give new concreteness to ideas about psychology in economics.
Feedback and Speculative Bubbles
The venerable notion of a speculative bubble can be described as a feedback mechanism operating through public observations of price increases and public expectations of future price increases. The feedback can also be described as a social epidemic, where certain public conceptions and ideas lead to emotional speculative interest in the markets and, therefore, to price increases; these, then, serve to reproduce those public conceptions and ideas in more people. This process repeats again and again, driving prices higher and higher, for a while. But the feedback cannot go on forever, and when prices stop increasing, the public interest in the investment may drop sharply: the bubble bursts.
This basic notion of the underpinnings of speculative bubbles can be traced back hundreds of years in the writings of commentators on speculative markets. The germ of the idea seems to go back to the time of the tulip mania in Holland in the 1630s (Shiller 2003) . But academic economists have long been cool to the idea that such feedback drives speculative prices, and it has remained, until recently, largely in the province of popular journalists. Academic economists who wrote about them (Galbraith 1954 , Kindleberger 1978 found that the academic profession, while in some dimensions interested in their work, largely distanced itself from their views. Part of the academic resistance has to do with unfortunate divisions in the profession: the notion of a speculative bubble is inherently sociological or social-psychological, and does not lend itself to study with the essential tool bag of economists.
In my book Irrational Exuberance (2000 Exuberance ( , 2005 , named after a famous remark of Alan Greenspan, I developed this popular notion of bubbles. I argued that various principles of psychology and sociology whose importance to economics has only recently become visible to most economists through the developing literature on behavioral economics help us to lend more concreteness to the feedback mechanism that creates speculative bubbles. These principles of psychology include psychological framing, representativeness heuristic, social learning, collective consciousness, attention anomalies, gambling anomalies such as myopic loss aversion, emotional contagion, and sensation seeking.
I argued that the feedback that creates bubbles has the primary effect of amplifying stories that justify the bubble; I called them "new era stories." The stories have to have a certain vividness to them if they are to be contagious and to get people excited about making risky investments. Contagion tends to work through word of mouth and through the news media. It may take a direct price-to-price form, as price increases generate further price increases.
News commentators on speculative phenomena clearly have the idea that contagion may be at work but tend to stay away from a really sociological view of speculative bubbles. They do not hear professional economists refer to such feedback often, so they are not confident of such a view. They tend to revert back to the comfortable notion that markets are efficient or that everything that happens in speculative markets ultimately comes from actions of the monetary authority. The social epidemic model, with its psychological and sociological underpinnings, is too poorly understood by economists in general to be represented as an authoritative view in media accounts.
I argued that a new era story that has been particularly amplified by the current housing boom is that the world is entering into a new era of capitalism, which is producing phenomenal economic growth, and at the same time producing both extreme winners and unfortunate losers. The phenomenal growth seen recently in China and India is part of the story, and the growing abundance of rich celebrities and extravagantly paid
CEOs is another. The new era story warns people that they have to join the capitalist world and buy their homestead now, before it is priced out of reach by hordes of wealthy new investors. I also listed a number of other driving factors, partially or totally independent of this story that also helped drive the housing boom.
That the recent speculative boom has generated high expectations for future home We should still be careful not to overemphasize bubble stories in interpreting market movements. There are other factors that drive prices. Of course, monetary policy, which has the potential to affect the level of interest rates and hence the discount rate, is an important factor. But, even beyond monetary policy, it must be appreciated that there are many factors that drive decisions to purchase long-term assets such as housing. The decision to buy a house is a major life decision for most people, and is affected by all the factors that people consider when deciding on their life style and purpose. The decision is postponable, and so anything that attracts attention to or away from housing can have a significant effect on the state of new construction.
investor horizons, and that perhaps explains why consumer confidence has not been harmed by the weakening housing market. It may also help explain why there is not panic selling, and suggests that home prices may yet recover.
Housing seems not to have been a very speculative asset until the last few decades, except in a few places where there is a story that encourages people to think that housing may be especially scarce. The conventional view among economists until recently has been that housing prices are driven primarily by construction costs. For example, this view was neatly laid out in 1956 by Grebler, Blank and Winnick.
It is not surprising that people did not view housing as a speculative asset: almost all of the value of houses has been value of structure, which is a manufactured good.
From this view, there would be no reason to think that one can make money by buying houses and holding them for resale than that one can make money by buying tables and chairs and holding them for resale. People apparently knew that home prices were dominated by structure prices. The recent real estate boom has changed this. According Whether this higher fraction of value attributed to land is a stable new equilibrium or is a temporary phenomenon induced by a speculative bubble remains to be seen.
Today, agricultural land sells for less than $2000 an acre, or about $300 per lot-sized parcel, a miniscule number compared to the cost of a structure. Of course, this is usually land in the wrong place, far from the urban areas and jobs and schools that people want to get on with their lives. But there is reason to expect that as existing urban land becomes very expensive relative to structures, there will be efforts to substitute away from that land, and so the fraction of value attributed to land in housing may be expected to meanrevert. Such substitution takes time.
New urban areas can be built elsewhere on land that is now cheap. Cities can economize on land by raising the population density and building high-rises. Already there is a movement advocating cities which, like Manhattan, or various urban areas in Europe and Asia, emphasize public transport, tall buildings bringing large numbers of people together. Such cities are highly attractive to many people because of the diversity of opportunity and entertainment there, and also simply because of the feeling of excitement of crowds. Such cities make very economical use of land. Many more such cities can be built in the future, though, especially in the US, such new cities run against conventional notions of suburbia and automobile-based life.
Christopher Leinberger (2007) has shown that there is an increasing demand for "walkable urban centers," and finds that prices of living space in such centers goes at a premium. This premium reflects tastes for a city with lots of attractions nearby, within walking distance. This taste is not being rapidly fulfilled because of coordination problems and zoning restrictions. But, some developers have been able to crack this nut. Concern about pollution, the environment and energy costs may also provide an impetus to move towards such cities. But the expectation that such new urban areas will be built is not a certainty yet, and will unfold if it does over many years.
Concern about economic inequality, which has been growing for decades now in most countries of the world, also has the potential to reduce barriers to the increase in the supply of housing and to bring prices down. For example, one of the first actions Gordon
Brown took upon becoming Prime Minister was to offer a number of proposals to encourage the construction of millions of new homes to relieve people priced out of the housing market.
Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai have gotten great attention for a paper arguing that it may be reasonable to suppose that great cities will indefinitely outperform the economy in general. They found that some "superstar cities" have shown long-term, that is 50-year, appreciation above national averages. But, their study found only relatively small excess returns to homes in those cities. Sinai themselves pointed out, even the small advantage in appreciation that they claimed to find for the superstar cities has been offset by a lower rent-price ratio in those cities.
Home Ownership and Consumption of Housing
Speculative booms in houses are unusual because purchasing a house is both an investment decision and a consumption decision. Moreover, the decision to purchase rather than rent is a decision not only to consume different kinds of housing services but also to lead a different kind of life; this difference has political ramifications, and so the purchase decision enters the arena of politics.
In the United States, the home price boom since the late 1990s was accompanied by a substantial increase in the home ownership rate (the percent of dwelling units owned by their occupants, as recorded by the U.S. Census). As can be seen from The change appears to be the result of changes in public expectations for the real estate market, rather than changes in government policy. Unlike the 1940s-60s boom in homeownership, the current boom is not largely due to government initiatives to increase the homeownership rate. Instead, there has been a uniform background of government approval for homeownership over a long time period.
There has long been a popular view that homeownership is a thing to be encouraged, and as a result philanthropists and government officials have tried to do so. of the cross-country variability of homeownership rates. They found that in cross-country studies the homeownership rate is negatively correlated with GDP per capita.
There is, however, likely to be a limit on how far public policy should attempt to But, we can note at first here that the 1950 economy was of course very unusual, for it followed World War II, a period when residential construction had been sharply curtailed for the war effort. After the war, there was a phenomenal baby boom, which translated into a sharply increased demand for housing after the war had decreased the supply. No fundamental shock approaching the magnitude of the World War II shock appears to have been at work in the post-2000 residential investment boom.
The right-most part of the figure can be used to illustrate a popular story for the latest home price boom, a story that it was all caused by the Fed. The real funds rate was cut sharply after 2000, and the housing boom (as measured by investment) took off.
Then, in 2003, the Fed started raising real interest rates, and, following that, with a lag of a couple years, residential investment fell sharply. This story, which one repeatedly hears casually suggested, puts the full blame for the housing boom and bust on the Fed. The accuracy of this story in corresponding to the data since 2000 can be visualized in the chart by noting the almost mirror-opposite of the two series since 2000.
But, the story is clearly an oversimplification at best as a model, because the same relation between residential investment and the funds rate had never been seen before in the entire period since 1950. In fact, before 2000, one sees rather more a positive, not negative relation between the real funds rate and residential investment as a percent of GDP. From the figure, it appears that just as good a story for a number of recessions would be that the Fed cut rates in response to weakening housing investment prior to the recession than that it caused the declines in housing investment by raising rates.
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Broad Historical Comparisons
There have been many real estate booms in history and real estate cycles that may be variously described as speculative booms or mere construction booms without any speculative enthusiasm. Norway. In all three countries the same general observations emerge: there has been an enormous home price boom since the 1990s, which dwarfs anything seen before.
Case Studies of Booms
Let us pursue here three case studies that illustrate the dynamics of real estate booms, with special attention to the psychology of the activity. We will consider here the 1950 home construction boom, which stands out in the figure above, the 1970s U.S.
farmland boom, and the sudden reversal in the market for homes in the United Kingdom in 2005, when a speculative market that was generally recognized as finished and in decline suddenly reversed and began booming again.
The 1950 U.S. Construction Boom
The only time when construction activity in the U.S. was higher as a percent of GDP than it was in 2005 was the year 1950, when residential investment rose to 7.3% of GDP. Construction activity was described at the time as at record levels in all major The new war against communists, coupled with the 1949 Soviet atomic bomb and the possible involvement of the Soviet Union in the war, led to an atomic bomb scare.
Columnist Drew Pearson wrote:
However, in this year 1950, half way through this modern and amazing century, we are in real danger of bogging down in an 'age of fear.' Faced with the awful knowledge that others have the atomic bomb, faced with fear of the hydrogen bomb, of bacteriological warfare, of new trans-oceanic submarines and transatlantic rockets, we are in definite danger of relapsing into an age of fear, an age when we do not go forward because we are paralyzed with fright.
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The fear led to concerted plans for civil defense, the construction of bomb shelters, and much talk about where the bombs might hit. It also led to a boom of new construction in the suburbs and countryside which allowed people to escape the risk of a possible nuclear attack on the center city, a powerful force that reshaped the country away from center cities. 20 One contemporary observer wrote of the suburban developers:
"They're cashing in on the steady trek of city families to the suburbs, a trend that may be getting a little extra push from the war scare and atom bomb developments."
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It is difficult to capture all the thinking that goes into people's decision to buy a home this year rather than another year. One gets a sense that those who were writing in 1950 were having as much difficulty in understanding mass thinking about real estate as we have today. One realtor who was interviewed in 1950 said simply "I also believe there is a psychological factor in home buying which is now expressing itself in a mass desire to buy homes." 
The 1970s Boom in U.S. Farmland Prices
Farmland prices went through an extraordinary boom in the 1970s. Figure 5 shows real US farmland prices since 1900. Two big events stand out in this century-plus of data:
a boom in the 1970s, a bust in the 1980s, and a renewed boom in the 2000s.
The farmland boom of the 1970s was sometimes attributed at the time to rising food prices. In fact, the farm products component of the US Producer Price Index rose a total of 9% relative to the Consumer Price Index from 1970 to 1980, and then leveled off.
These movements are not big enough to justify the farmland boom and bust.
More important than the food prices may be the "great population scare" of the 1970s.
In 1972, a Club of Rome study Limits on Growth, authored by Donella H. Meadows and her colleagues at MIT predicted that expanding population growth would soon lead to exhaustion of resources, and a prominent scenario in their analysis was mass starvation around the world. The book received extraordinary attention, even though it was criticized by the economics establishment as alarmist and without substantial evidence.
The effects of this scare were felt all over the world. For example, China instituted her one-child policy in 1979.
Changes in the behavior of institutions were part of the boom phenomenon. Tax institutions changed in the direction of support for the boom. US Federal tax law was changed in 1976 to allow farm estates left to a member of the immediate family to be valued at a capitalization of rents, rather than the high market prices, for computation of estate taxes, and to be paid over 15 years. Thus, it appears that the boom stimulated
Congress to place farmland in a special privileged category for capital-gains tax purposes.
In the high-inflation years of the late 1970s, a theory began to take hold among institutional investors that farmland is a good inflation hedge. In 1980, the New York Times wrote:
Investment funds, traditionally leery of investment in farmland, are starting to flow more rapidly into agriculture. Several major insurance companies have stepped up their purchase of farmland in the past two years and a number of other institutions ''are beginning to express greater interest in farmland,'' according to Irving S. Wolfson, executive vice president of the Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company of Hartford.
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Meanwhile, investment funds specializing in farmland investments were set up, such as the American Agricultural Investment Management Co and Oppenheimer Industries.
Newspaper accounts of the time described the 1970s as due in part to speculative foreign investors:
Although much of the foreign money is hard to trace, European Investment Research Center, a private consulting firm based in Brussels, estimates that foreigners invested some $800 million in farmland last year. That would come to a startling 30% of all foreign direct investment in the U.S., according to the Commerce Dept. "What we are witnessing," says Kenneth R. Krause, a senior economist for the Agriculture Dept., "is the biggest, continuing wave of investment in American farmland since the turn of the century." . . . Amrex Inc., a San Francisco-based real estate firm, is holding a meeting in Zurich next week to introduce buyers to sellers who represent as much as $750 million worth of U.S. farmland. Some observers warn that the industry is attracting its share of hucksterism as well. West German newspapers are being flooded with real estate advertisements, apparently from small U.S. brokers, that often offer only an anonymous post office box number for an address.
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The boom period coincided with a common theme in newspapers of the time that there was concern that farmland was rapidly shrinking as it was converted to homes, shopping centers and parking lots, thereafter likely never to return to cultivation. It seemed like a brand new idea: who had ever thought that a farm, once converted, would never again 23 Ann Crittenden, "Farmland Lures Investors," New York Times, November 24, 1980 p. D1. 24 "Foreign investors flock to U.S. farmlands," Business Week, March 27, 1978, p. 79. revert back to farmland? Eventually, a 1980 federal study "National Agricultural Lands Study" sounded this alarm. In describing this study, US Agriculture Secretary Bob Bergland noted then that the idea that farmland was being consumed was a new one: "This question never has been seriously addressed because, for as long as I can remember, all of us thought we had land to spare." After the correction following 1980, the 1970s explosion of farm prices was described as a dramatic bubble. One account, in 1983, wrote that values "overexpanded in the belief that inflationary runups in land prices would never end."
26 It does appear that it was a bubble, and spurred by stories and lore that emphasized the emerging scarcity of farmland. It was perhaps a more rational one than the housing bubble we appear to be in recently, for at least farm land is not reproducible, as housing structures are.
The Turnaround in London Home Prices in 2005
Figure 6 The 2004-5 downturn in UK home prices was the subject of thousands of newspaper articles at the time. Some of these articles spoke of the "end of the housing boom" or "the last desperate gasp of a defunct housing boom" as if this end were selfevident. Even those that were relatively optimistic did not predict the strong recovery that actually transpired. One reporter wrote that "even optimists forecast prices will rise by no more than 2 per cent annually in the next few years-and pessimists expect an outright were also noted. Since the Bank of England had raised rates, while other central banks had not, blame for the weakening housing market was often attributed to the temporary effects of these rate increases, rather than to any change in market psychology, thereby discouraging any sudden change in expectations about long-run home price increases.
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There is a sort of coordination problem with psychological expectations in a time of a boom. If people infer their expectations from recent price changes not just at home but in other places, then it may be hard for sharply changed expectations ever to take root. People believe that a change in market psychology drives the housing market, and if they look both near and far to gauge the psychology of others, then it will be hard to see a change.
Moreover, the kind of expectation for home prices that is implicit in the common 21 st century world view, that increasing home prices are the result of our capitalist institutions and the phenomenal economic growth that the adoption and perfection of these institutions around the world has brought about, is not likely to be changed suddenly by the appearance of short-run price declines. This London case study should caution any who feel that a substantial decline in home prices in the US is inevitable, given the recent declines, but not really offer much comfort for real estate optimists either, given the isolation, and special character, of the brief London downturn.
Conclusion
The view developed here of the boom in home prices since the late 1990s has it operating as a classic speculative bubble, driven largely by extravagant expectations for Monetary policy does not come out as central in the case studies examined here.
Monetary policy is in an important sense concentrated on the extreme short-term. The fundamental target variable in the U.S. is the federal funds rate, an overnight rate. And yet, economic decision makers are focused on a lifetime decision problem. Economic decision makers have to decide on the long-term, 50-year-plus, value of their investments. The difference of maturities is a factor on the order of 10,000 to one. Using monetary policy to manage such decisions is a little bit like adding a grain of sand a day to a scale that is weighing a car.
People's opinions about long-term decisions, notably how much housing to buy and what is a reasonable price to pay, change in the short term only because their opinions about the long-term change. But, these opinions about the long-term are hard to quantify because they are usually not expressed. They are usually expressed only in story form, in attention given to homespun theories, and the like.
People base life decisions upon vague expectations for the future, and if they have the false impression that they have a unique property that is going to become extremely valuable in the future, then they may consume more, driving the economy, and they may drive up prices today. That is what we have seen happening over much of the last decade.
The psychological expectations coordination problem appears to be a major factor in explaining the extreme momentum of home price increases. Investors who think that home prices will continue to go up because they perceive prices as going up generally around the world may not change this expectation easily since they will have trouble coordinating on a time to make the change. A housing supply response to high prices will tend to bring prices down, but the increment to housing supply in any one year is necessarily tiny given the nature of construction technology, and that supply can be The boom cycle that followed these declines, after the late 1990s, was even bigger than that preceded them, and so it is not improbable that we will see such large real price declines extending over many years in major cities that have seen large increases. Since the number of cities involved in the recent boom is so much higher than in the last boom,
we could see much more than the 15% real drop in real national home price indices that we saw last time. 
